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Global supply chains and sustainability: the role of disclosure and due diligence 
laws 
 
 
CHARLOTTE VILLIERS 
 
 
1. Introduction 
There is now considerable empirical evidence showing that income and wealth inequality can harm 
environmental sustainability.1 Mikkelson, Gonzalez and Peterson conclude that ‘a 1% increase in the 
Gini ratio is associated with an almost 2% rise in the number of threatened species’.2 Dorling et al also 
show that rich countries with higher inequality consume more resources and generate more waste 
per person.3 Economic and social values may be reflected in actual government expenditure so that 
countries with higher scores on ‘economic individualism’ have lower levels of overall government 
spending per capita.4 Many such threats to sustainability, with increasing inequality, are compounded 
in the context of global supply chains. Indeed, according to Ernst and Young, companies ‘consistently 
recognize that they are less advanced in their supply chain sustainability efforts than their direct 
operations due to the complex nature of sustainability in their supply chain’.5 
This chapter explores the role of corporations that participate in global supply chains and looks 
specifically at the legislation emerging to try to address the problems that arise in a supply chain 
context. There is a notable shift from voluntary initiatives towards hard law solutions, in particular 
disclosure and due diligence requirements. The argument I will pursue is that the disclosure measures 
introduced internationally and nationally only partially assist the efforts to achieve sustainability. Such 
measures are limited to achieve transparency, but they do not necessarily achieve progress in their 
substantive outcomes. Due diligence is more promising but to bring about the desired outcomes will 
require more active engagement with stakeholders, social movements and third parties. The next 
section will outline how global supply chains impact on sustainability and will describe the 
complexities of supply chains and the problems arising from such complex arrangements. Section 3 
provides an overview of the disclosure provisions and highlights their limitations. Section 4 analyses 
                                                 
1 J. K. Boyce, ‘Inequality as a cause of environmental degradation’ Ecological Economics, (1994) 11(3), 169-178; 
S. N. Islam, Inequality and environmental sustainability (2015, No. 145, 30) DESA Working Paper, at 1. See also 
T.M. Selden and D. Song, ‘Environmental quality and development: is there a Kuznets curve for air pollution 
emissions?’ J. Environ. Econ. Manag. (1994) 27, 147-162. 
2 G.M. Mikkelson, A. Gonzalez, & G. D. Peterson, Economic Inequality Predicts Biodiversity Loss (2007)  PLoS 
ONE, 2(5), e444. doi: 10.1371/journal. pone.0000444, at 2. The Gini coefficient is a measure of income 
inequality that condenses the entire income distribution for a country into a single number between 0 and 1: 
the higher the number, the greater the degree of income inequality. See further: Gini Coefficient of Inequality 
at https://www.statsdirect.com/help/nonparametric_methods/gini_coefficient.htm  
3 D. Dorling Is more equal more green? (London: University of Sheffield, 2010); D. Dorling, ‘Social Inequality 
and Environmental Justice’ Environmental Scientist, (2010) 19(3), 9-13; D. Dorling, A. Barford, and B. Wheeler 
‘Health Impacts of an environmental disaster: a polemic’, Environmental Research Letters, (2007) 2(045007), 
11pp. doi:10.1088/1748-9326/2/4/045007 (www. worldmapper.org), cited by Islam, Inequality and 
environmental sustainability, at 4. 
4 J. Haupt, J and C. Lawrence, ‘Unexpected connections: income inequality and environmental degradation’ 13 
(February 2012), Shaping Tomorrow’s World, at 
http://www.shapingtomorrowsworld.org/hauptInequality.html  
5 Ernst and Young, The state of sustainable supply chains: building responsible and resilient supply chains, 
(2016), at 14. 
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the due diligence provisions and their potential to help reduce social and environmental harms. The 
chapter concludes by suggesting that further steps are required to build on the due disclosure 
measures if they are to fulfil such potential. In particular, their implementation requires joint 
participation of stakeholders, social movements and third parties. Without collective action, due 
diligence will amount to little more than a business dominated transparency machine that generates 
information without leading to substantive behavioural change.  
2.  Global supply chains and their impact on sustainability 
Global supply chains6 (sometimes called global value chains or global production chains)7 are an 
established and widely used production arrangement across many industries, including 
manufacturing, energy, agri-food industry, and a myriad of financial and business services.8 The United 
Nations Conference on Trade Development (UNCTAD) suggested that global supply chains, shaped by 
transnational corporations, ‘account for some 80% of global trade’9 and the ILO has estimated that 
more than 450 million people work in supply chain-related jobs.10 Global supply chains have brought 
with them some benefits, such as employment and economic growth to developing economies and 
the possibility, at least in theory, of social upgrading.11 However, global supply chains also bring costs.  
The European Parliament observes their benefits and their costs: they  
‘offer new prospects for economic growth, sustainable development, the involvement of civil 
society, workers and business associations, and for job creation for companies within the 
production chain, by enabling them to focus on specific tasks while increasing their 
interdependence; whereas, on the other hand, their extremely complex nature, lack of 
transparency and dilution of liabilities may lead to a higher risk of human and labour rights 
violations, factual impunity for environmental crimes and large-scale tax avoidance and tax 
fraud.’12  
The predominant feature of global supply chains is that of an ‘international fragmentation of 
production’.13 They have multiple tiers without being strictly linear and they have horizontal, vertical 
and spatial complexities – static and dynamic14 – that interact and lead to uncertainties and production 
                                                 
6 See also J. Salminen, ‘Sustainability and the Move from Corporate Governance to Governance Through 
Contract’, chapter 5 in this volume.  
7 These are generally interchangeable terms. In this chapter I will mostly refer to them as global supply chains.  
8 M. Rawling, ‘Legislative regulation of global value chains to protect workers: A preliminary Assessment’ 26(4) 
The Economic and Labour Relations Review, (2015) 660, at 663. 
9 UNCTAD, World Investment Report (2013) iii. WTO and Others, Global Value Chain Development Report 
2017: Measuring and Analyzing the Impact of GVCs on Economic Development, September 2017 at 2, available 
at https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/gvcd_report_17_e.htm    
10 International Labour Organization, ‘Forced labour, human trafficking and slavery’, 
undated, http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/forced-labour/lang--en/index.htm 
11 See discussion in L. Lee, Global Supply Chain Dynamics and Labour Governance: Implications for Social 
Upgrading, ILO Research Paper No. 14, (May 2016) 
12 European Parliament Motion for a Resolution 2016/2301 (INI) Report 20 July 2017, para C.  
13 OECD, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) (2013) Implications of Global Value Chains for Trade, Investment, Development and Jobs 6 August 
2013. Prepared for the G-20 Leaders Summit, Saint Petersburg, September, at 11.   
14 S. Serdarasan, ‘A review of supply chain complexity drivers’, Computers & Industrial Engineering, (2013) 
66(3), 533-540.  See also S. Sarpong  ‘Traceability and supply chain complexity: confronting the issues and 
concerns’, European Business Review, (2014) 26(3), 271-284. 
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disruptions,15 as well as regulatory challenges.16 The fragmented nature of the production processes 
leads many chains to require multiple layers of suppliers. Whilst companies may be able to locate their 
first-tier suppliers, the suppliers in the lower tiers are often less easy to identify.17 Sarfaty reveals that 
one company required more than a year to map its supply chain18, and quotes an employee of 
technology company Philips explaining that, “for electronic components, the supply chain can easily 
be 50 tiers deep, many of which may provide us with limited or no information”.19 In 2015, Apple had 
785 suppliers in 31 countries worldwide contributing to the production of the iPhone.20 According to 
the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, 2017, up to 94 per cent of the global workforce of 
50 major corporations is hidden because responsibility has been outsourced multiple times.21  
This complexity gives opportunities for regulatory arbitrage, resulting in governance and regulatory 
gaps.22 Thus, while multinational companies might be incorporated and headquartered in a particular 
jurisdiction, many of their economic activities occur abroad in areas that are beyond the regulatory 
reach of their home jurisdiction. The potential regulatory problems arising from the extraterritorial 
reach of those activities are not necessarily resolved by the efforts of international or 
intergovernmental institutions because their regulatory capacities are limited.23 Furthermore, the 
companies or suppliers may operate in developing countries which do not have sufficient resources 
or structures for effective regulation.24 Host states may turn a blind eye to domestic law violations or 
shy away from passing human rights regulations, fearing that companies might shift their business 
elsewhere to avoid regulatory burdens.25 Weak governance then paves the way for corruption and 
human rights violations,26 with adverse consequences for sustainability. 
According to Ernst and Young, UN Global Compact participants ‘rank supply chain practices as the 
biggest challenge to improving their sustainability performance.’ Thus, extending the UN Global 
Compact’s Ten Principles into the supply chain can be difficult ‘because of the scale and complexity of 
many supply chains.’27 They are often coordinated by powerful, multinational lead firms that source 
quality goods and services at the lowest cost and thus through their own profit seeking behaviour they 
exploit the workers at the bottom of their chains.28 Global supply chains have potential to undermine 
the goal of sustainability – weak or strong – in many ways and across all dimensions. Lead firms 
                                                 
15 C. Bode and S.M. Wagner, ‘Structural drivers of upstream supply chain complexity and the frequency of 
supply chain disruptions’, Journal of Operations Management, (2015) 36, 215-228. 
16 See eg Jingchen Zhao, ‘A critical analysis of extraterritorial attempts at addressing challenges to 
sustainability’ chapter 3 in this volume. 
17 G. A. Sarfaty, ‘Shining light on global supply chains’, Harv. Int'l LJ, (2015) 56, 419, at 431. 
18 Shift Project, Respecting Human Rights through Global Supply Chains, 7 (2012) cited by Sarfaty, ‘Shining 
Light’,  fn 78, at 431. 
19 Ibid. 
20 J. G. Ruggie, ‘Multinationals as global institutions: Power, authority and relative autonomy’ Regulation and 
Governance (2017) at 3. 
21 Business & Human Rights Resource Centre (BHRCC), Modern slavery in company operations and supply 
chains: mandatory transparency, mandatory due diligence and public procurement due diligence, (September 
2017).  
22 Sarfaty, ‘Shining light’, 433. See further Zhao, chapter 3 in this volume.  
23 Ibid. 
24 K. Kolben, ‘Transnational labor regulation and the limits of governance’, Theoretical Inquiries in Law 12.2 
(2011): 403-437, at 406. 
25 A. S. Chilton, and G. A. Sarfaty, The Limitations of Supply Chain Disclosure Regimes. Stan. J. Int'l L., (2017) 53, 
1, at 8, citing S. R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 Yale L.J. (2001) 
443, at 460 and 463. 
26 Ruggie, ‘Multinationals as global institutions’, at 8, citing OECD, Risk Awareness Tool For Multinational 
Enterprises In Weak Governance Zones (2006). 
27 Ernst and Young, The State of Sustainable Supply Chains (2016) at 2.  
28 Rawling, ‘Legislative regulation of global supply chains’ at 661. 
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operate by externalising the responsibilities for the production process and for how the workers are 
treated. At the same time, they impose their powerful position to keep the production costs low and 
to maximise their profits.29 The supplier is then left with little choice but to cut its own production 
costs and to pass those on by paying lower wages to the workers and leaving them to work in unsafe 
production facilities with few labour law rights or protections. The end result is employment with 
deleterious effects upon workers, including poverty pay and unfree labour.30 Human Rights Watch, 
for example, documents poor working conditions, including minimum wage violations; forced 
overtime; child labour; sexual harassment, exposure to toxic substances and other extreme 
occupational hazards; and retaliation against workers who attempt to organize.31 Global supply chains 
also operate in ways that may cause environmental damage such as through mining, deforestation, 
pollution, and carbon footprint. The UN Global Compact Office and the Business for Social 
Responsibility organization, in the second edition of their document Supply Chain Sustainability: A 
Practical Guide for Continuous Improvement, observe that ‘environmental impacts from supply chains 
are often severe, and might include toxic waste, water pollution, loss of biodiversity, deforestation, 
long term damage to ecosystems, water scarcity, hazardous air emissions as well as high greenhouse 
gas emissions and energy use.’32 Frequently linked to ‘exploitative employment relations, 
environmental irresponsibility and recurrent ethical dilemmas’, they contribute to global poverty and 
wealth and income inequality, a ‘risk that is most likely to cause serious damage globally’.33  
 
3. International and national disclosure requirements  
Recognising these problems, a number of international organisations have sought to guide corporate 
behaviour with the introduction of standards and principles. National legislatures have acted to 
supplement those international efforts. This section explores these measures which are put into 
practice through use of disclosure requirements.   
 
3.1 International measures 
 
In June 2011, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UN HRC) unanimously endorsed the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs).34 These became the first globally accepted 
standard on the responsibilities of states and businesses for preventing and addressing business-
related human rights abuse. The principles are based on the UN ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ 
Framework, approved in 2008. The 31 UNGPs require that businesses should respect human rights. In 
particular, Principle 13 states that business should ‘avoid causing or contributing to adverse human 
                                                 
29 T. Clarke and M. Boersma, ‘The governance of global value chains: Unresolved human rights, environmental 
and ethical dilemmas in the apple supply chain’, Journal of Business Ethics, (2017) 143(1), 111-131, 
at 115-6. 
30 B. Selwyn, Global Value Chains or Global Poverty Chains? A new research agenda, (2016) available at 
https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=selwyn-global-chains-2016-w-
imprint.pdf&site=359  at 5. 
31 Human Rights Watch, Human Rights in Supply Chains: A Call for a Binding Global Standard on Due Diligence, 
(May 2016) available at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/05/30/human-rights-supply-chains/call-binding-
global-standard-due-diligence  
32  UN Global Compact Office and BSR, Supply Chain Sustainability: A Practical Guide for Continuous 
Improvement (2nd edition, 2015) at 9. 
33 D. Tapscott, ‘Davos Group Sees Income Inequality as Top Global Risk’ Huffington Post, 21 January 2014, at 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/don-tapscott/davos-group-sees-income-i_b_4639340.html  See also World 
Economic Forum, Global Risks 2014, Ninth Edition, (WEF, Geneva, 2014) at 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalRisks_Report_2014.pdf  
34 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 2011, 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf   
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rights impacts through their own activities, and address such impacts when they occur’35 and ‘seek to 
prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly linked to their operations, products 
or services by their business relationships, even if they have not contributed to those impacts’36 . 
Principle 15(a) stipulates that businesses should have in place a policy commitment to meet their 
responsibility to respect human rights. In addition, the UN Global Compact encourages businesses to 
adopt sustainable and socially responsible policies and lays down ten principles in the areas of human 
rights, labour, the environment and anti-corruption.  
 
Other organizations have taken steps to strengthen the impact of the UN’s efforts. The OECD has 
developed in its Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, a set of recommendations addressed by 
governments to multinational enterprises. They were revised in 2011 to take into account the UNGPs 
and the revisions introduced standards on human rights, due diligence and supply chain responsibility. 
Whilst they are non-binding, the Guidelines have a hybrid status requiring National Contact Points to 
further their effect.37  
 
At European level the Non-Financial Reporting Directive has become the instrument used for 
introducing a requirement for certain large undertakings (public interest entities) to include in their 
management reports a non-financial statement containing information relating to environmental 
matters, social and employee-related matters, respect for human rights, anti-corruption and bribery 
matters. The Directive references at paragraph 9 the UNGPs and the OECD Guidelines as regimes that 
companies might adhere to in their provision of the relevant non-financial information. The statement 
should include a description of the policies, outcomes and risks related to those matters and 
information on the due diligence processes implemented by the undertaking, also regarding, where 
relevant and proportionate, its supply and subcontracting chains, in order to identify, prevent and 
mitigate existing and potential adverse impacts.38 The statement might include information on the 
prevention of human rights abuses and on measures taken to prevent bribery or corruption.39  
 
3.2 National Measures 
 
For disclosure-oriented transparency the most widely publicised developments include the California 
Transparency in Supply Chains Act 2010 and the UK’s Modern Slavery Act 2015.  
 
The California Transparency in Supply Chains Act 2010 requires website disclosure of any actions being 
taken to eradicate slavery and human trafficking from a corporation’s direct supply chain for tangible 
goods offered for sale. The company must disclose on its website ‘to what extent, if any,’ it: 1) verifies 
its product supply chains to evaluate and address risks of human trafficking and slavery; 2) audits its 
suppliers to evaluate their compliance with company standards for human trafficking and slavery; 3) 
requires certifications from direct suppliers confirming that materials incorporated into the products 
comply with laws regarding human trafficking and slavery in the countries in which the suppliers 
operate; 4) maintains internal accountability through internal standards and procedures for 
employees and contractors that fail to meet company standards regarding human trafficking and 
slavery; and 5) trains company employees and management who have direct responsibility for supply 
                                                 
35 Principle 13(a). 
36 Principle 13(b). 
37 S. van't Foort, ‘The History of National Contact Points and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises.’ (2017) at https://transparencia.org.es/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/puntos_nacionales_contacto_directrices_ocde.pdf   
38 Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 amending Directive 
2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large undertakings and 
groups, OJ L 330, 15.11.2014, p. 1–9, Preamble, paragraph 6. 
39 See also Article 1(1) and 1(3). 
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chain management on human trafficking and slavery.40 A company may comply with the law by posting 
only one statement ever, since the Act does not specify how frequently a statement must be made.41 
The California Attorney General has exclusive authority to enforce the legislation leading a civil action 
for injunctive relief. By 2015, the Attorney General had not used this power of enforcement.42 
Companies do not face a monetary penalty for failure to disclose, but the Attorney General may order 
them to take specific action. Citizens have no private right of action under the Act although there is 
evidence of private litigants using class action-friendly California statutes, such as the Unfair 
Competition Law and False Advertising Law, to bring class actions in which they may allege violations 
of the Transparency legislation.43 A Federal US Business Transparency in Trafficking and Slavery Bill 
targets all businesses with revenues above US$100 million and if enacted will require them to describe 
in their annual reports how they assess and address slavery in their supply chains.44  
 
In the UK, section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 requires any commercial organisation, which 
supplies goods or services, carries on a business or part of a business in the UK, and whose annual 
turnover is £36 m to produce a slavery and human trafficking statement for each financial year. The 
report must provide details of what the organisation is doing to ‘ensure that slavery and human 
trafficking is not taking place in any of its supply chains, and in any part of its own business.’ Section 
54 contains a non-exhaustive list of the issues that the statement ‘may’ cover, including: the 
organisation’s structure, its business and its supply chains; its policies in relation to slavery and human 
trafficking; its due diligence processes in relation to slavery and human trafficking in its business and 
supply chains; the parts of its business and supply chains where there is a risk of slavery and human 
trafficking taking place, and the steps it has taken to assess and manage that risk; its effectiveness in 
ensuring that slavery and human trafficking is not taking place in its business or supply chains, 
measured against such performance indicators; and the training and capacity building about slavery 
and human trafficking available to its staff. If a company fails to produce a slavery and human 
trafficking statement for a particular financial year the UK Secretary of State may seek an injunction 
from the High Court requiring the organisation to comply. Some have suggested that this would be 
‘an unlikely course of action.’45 In such an event, failure to comply with the injunction would put the 
company in contempt of a court order, which is punishable by an unlimited fine.  
 
Commentators have remarked on the weaknesses in both the California Act and the UK Act stating 
that  
 
neither law requires that companies report on the prevalence or known incidences of modern 
slavery in their operations or supply chains, nor do they include any positive obligation for a 
company to implement measures or introduce any policies or operational changes to ensure 
that their operations and supply chains are free from slavery. In fact, under both laws 
companies can comply by stating they have taken no steps to address the risk of modern 
slavery in any form in their business and supply chain.46  
 
                                                 
40 BHRRC (2017) at 8.  
41 Ibid.  
42 See Mintz Viewpoint, ‘When Transparency Is Not Enough: Class Action Litigation Under California's 
Transparency in Supply Chains Act’, 12 November 2015, at https://www.mintz.com/insights-
center/viewpoints/2015-11-when-transparency-not-enough-class-action-litigation-under   
43 Ibid. 
44 HR 3226, 114th Congress (2015-16)., referred to the House Committee on Financial Actions. See further: 
BHRRC (2017) at 8.   
45 S. Shooter, The Modern Slavery Act: An Update, Bird &Bird, (12 September 2017), available at 
https://www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2017/uk/the-modern-slavery-act-update  
46 BHRRC, Modern slavery in company operations, at 10. 
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Furthermore, lack of statutory sanctions will do little to encourage companies to report or to 
implement robust due diligence processes.47 Due diligence processes are not compulsory, nor is 
reporting on them under these statutes. More positively, perhaps, the Modern Slavery Act could lead 
indirectly to enforcement via companies seeking to avoid the commercial risk of reputational damage 
and adverse public reaction. NGOs might also be persuaded to monitor the extent of compliance with 
the disclosure provisions and in turn push for more substantive action. In California, for example, a 
class action was raised against Costco, alleging that Costco’s statement misled consumers by implying 
its products were ‘slavery free’.48   
 
The results of the Modern Slavery Act have been modest so far. The Act has not led to full and effective 
disclosure by corporations. In 2016, the Business & Human Rights Resource Centre found that only 15 
of 27 statements analysed (56 per cent) complied with the minimum requirements. Their analysis 
showed ‘patchy compliance with the substantive provisions of the Act.’49 Only a small number of the 
27 FTSE 100 companies analysed provided information on risks they identified in their operations and 
supply chains and explained how they addressed them. Most companies provided little information 
on the structure and complexity of their supply chains, and very few provided information on specific 
risks in those chains. Only two companies reported developing performance indicators.50 A 
subsequent briefing released in June 2017 by CORE Coalition revealed that only around 14 per cent 
out of over 2,100 statements under the MSA comply with the minimum requirements and most of 
those provide little information on the six areas the Act suggests companies to report on.51 According 
to a 2016 review of 230 MSA company statements conducted by Ergon Associates, most fail to comply 
with minimum requirements; 40 per cent had not been signed by a director, and about 30 per cent 
were not accessible via a link easily found on the company’s web-site.52 Ergon’s review also noted 
poor reporting on key performance indicators, and that 35 per cent of statements ‘say nothing on the 
question of their risk assessment processes’.53  
 
 
3.3 Evaluation of the disclosure measures54 
 
Disclosure regulation is based on an ‘assumption that information matters and information can 
empower.’55 However, such empowerment depends on information that is valuable, accessible, 
                                                 
47 Ibid, at 11.  
48 Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, Section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act – transparency in supply chains, 29 
October 2015, at 
http://knowledge.freshfields.com/en/global/r/1314/section_54_of_the_modern_slavery_act___transparency
_in  
49 BHRRC, ‘Modern slavery in company operations’, at 13. 
50 Ibid. at 13. 
51 CORE, Modern Slavery reporting: Weak and Notable Practice, (June 2017), at http://corporate-
responsibility.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Core_ExamplesFINAL.pdf 
52 Ergon Associates, Reporting on Modern Slavery: The Current State of Disclosure, May 2016, at 
http://ergonassociates.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Reporting-on-Modern-Slavery2-May-
2016.pdf?x74739.  See also Ergon Associates, Modern Slavery Statements: One Year On, April 2017, at 
http://ergonassociates.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/MSA_One_year_on_April_2017.pdf?x74739  
53 Ibid. 
54 See further,Iris Chiu, ‘Disclosure Regulation in Corporate Social Responsibility- (New) Legalisation and New 
Governance Implications’, chapter 27 in this volume. 
55 A. Gupta, Transparency Under Scrutiny: Information Disclosure in Global Environmental Governance (2008) 
8:2 Global Environmental Politics, at 2 quoting Florini, Ann.1998. The End of Secrecy. Foreign Policy 111 
(Summer): 50–63 at 3. 
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comprehensible and comparable.56 Yet difficulties stand in the way of effective and empowering 
disclosure regulation, including: proliferation of measures that may compete or contradict each other, 
commodification of information, power reinforcement, information overload with consequent lack of 
enforcement or remediation.  
 
3.3.1 Proliferation of measures 
 
The multiplicity of measures contributes to inconsistencies and lack of coherence. This has been the 
experience in environmental reporting where multiple frameworks, and tension between the 
corporate and stakeholder objectives in transparency have ‘produced a number of governance 
systems that might be applied simultaneously and to different effect and for different 
constituencies.’57 As Backer observes, ‘In the aggregate, these transparency systems are incoherent, 
making miscommunication likely and assessment across systems difficult.’58  
 
3.3.2 Marketization 
 
Emphasis on business case arguments for disclosure causes the processes to be a means for 
corporations to secure market leadership59 rather than really to reduce the problems that their 
activities bring about.  Disclosure has indeed become increasingly marketized or commodified.60 
Disclosure systems more often compete and are shaped by investor and consumer tastes rather than 
by science and policy.61 New intermediaries/powerbrokers facilitate, translate, certify, interpret and 
articulate information in order to make it available and useful for different categories inside and 
outside value chains and networks.62 Environmental NGOs gain advantage too as they seek financial 
compensation for their logos and endorsements designed to enhance reputation, trust and legitimacy 
for the companies who use them.63  
 
3.3.3 Power 
 
In supply chains lead companies seize power over the actors further down the supply chain not just in 
their production processes but also in disclosures made64 by coordinating and enforcing agreements, 
transmitting environmental and human rights norms, and also by conducting due diligence along their 
supply chains.65 They are able to manage and control the information flow and to pin blame on 
                                                 
56 K. Dingwerth and M. Eichinger, ‘Tamed transparency: How information disclosure under the Global 
Reporting Initiative fails to empower’, Global Environmental Politics 10.3 (2010): 74-96, at 75, citing A. Fung, et 
al, Full Disclosure. The Perils and Promise of Transparency (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
57 L. C. Backer, ‘Transparency between norm, technique and property in international law and governance: The 
example of corporate disclosure regimes and environmental impacts.’ Minn. J. Int'l L. 22 (2013): 1, at 48. 
58Ibid, 49-50. See also Villiers, C & Mahonen, J, 2015, ‘Article 11: Integrated reporting or non-financial 
reporting?’. in: Beate Sjafjell, Anja Wiesbrock (eds) The Greening of European Business under EU Law: Taking 
Article 11 TFEU Seriously. (Routledge), pp. 118-143; and Villiers, C & Mahonen, J, 2015, ‘Accounting, auditing 
and reporting: supporting or obstructing the sustainable companies objective?’. in: Beate Sjafjell, Benjamin J 
Richardson (eds) Company Law and Sustainability: Legal Barriers and Opportunities (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge), pp. 175-225 
59 Dingwerth and Eichinger, at 80. 
60 Backer, 66. 
61 Backer, 70. 
62 A. Mol, ‘Transparency and value chain sustainability’, Journal of Cleaner Production, (2015) 107, 154-161 at 
155. 
63 Mol, 2010, at 139. 
64 Mol (2015) at 157. 
65 Sarfaty, ‘Shining a light’ at 432. 
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suppliers for information.66 Sometimes, however, the suppliers gain power over the buyer firms when 
the buyer or lead firm is unable to switch to another supplier or lacks purchasing power. Then, the 
lead firm may be forced to tolerate non-compliant and opportunistic behaviour by (perhaps 
geographically distant) suppliers.67  
 
3.3.4 The recipients of information 
 
The information provided is not always useful or relevant in practice and does not necessarily meet 
the needs of the recipients. For example, consumers might not be able to discover the extent of 
human rights abuses in supply chains nor to identify which companies are making comprehensive 
efforts to protect human rights and which are not.68 Consumers may be further disempowered69 by 
information overload or ‘data fog’70, being swamped by too many, or too technically complex, 
disclosures.71. Thus, Cooper and Owen reveal that corporate disclosures offer little opportunity for 
facilitating action on the part of organizational stakeholders and therefore do not give rise to 
accountability.72  
 
 
4.  Due Diligence 
 
In light of these problems and the apparent limitations of the disclosure legislation, there have been 
calls to take steps towards due diligence. For example, the UK Joint Committee on Human Rights has 
recommended the UK government to propose legislation to make reporting on due diligence for all 
human rights compulsory for large businesses, with a monitoring mechanism and an enforcement 
procedure, and the strengthening of the UK National Contact Point. At the international level also, 
due diligence has been advocated as a process with potential for progress. The UN Guiding Principle 
15(b), for example, in urging businesses to respect human rights, proposes that they adopt a human 
rights due diligence process to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their 
impacts on human rights. Similarly, the OECD has issued additional Guidance documents such as the 
OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and 
High Risk Areas in 2011, the third edition of which was published in 2016, and also the OECD Due 
Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains in the Garment and Footwear Sectors in 2017, and 
most recently, the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct, of May 2018 
which aims to provide guidance to enterprises on their implementation of the OECD’s Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises 2011. Human Rights Watch has argued for the OECD’s Guidance documents 
to become binding rather than voluntary.73 
 
4.1 What is due diligence? 
 
                                                 
66 Backer, at 47. 
67 Sarfaty, ‘ Shining a light’ at 433. 
68 Chilton and Sarfaty, ‘Limitations of Supply Chain Disclosure Regimes’ (2017) at 46. 
69 Mol, 2015, 158.  
70  D. Shenk, Data Smog. Surviving the Information Glut. (Harper Collins, New York, 1997). 
  cited by Mol, (2015) at 158. 
71 Chilton and Sarfaty, (2107)  at 22. 
72 S. M. Cooper and D. L. Owen, ‘Corporate social reporting and stakeholder accountability: The missing 
link’ Accounting, Organizations and Society, (2007)  32(7), 649-667. 
73 Human Rights Watch note that the Guidance has become part of the legal framework in a number of African 
countries, including the DRC, Burundi and Rwanda where sanctions are included for failure to comply (OECD, A 
Global Standard: Towards responsible mineral supply chains, available at 
https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/Brochure_OECD-Responsible-Mineral-Supply-Chains.pdf). 
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Due diligence goes beyond simply making statements about the risks of human rights abuses or 
environmental damage and what policies a company has in place within its supply chain to avoid those 
risks or to measure its impacts. Due diligence requires companies to demonstrate that they are taking 
measures to prevent or mitigate their negative impacts.74 The UN and the OECD focus on identification 
of risks and requiring companies then to seek to eradicate those risks and to account for any adverse 
impacts that do occur. Thus, due diligence is defined by the UN and the OECD as a risk-based process 
‘through which enterprises can identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their 
actual and potential adverse impacts’.  
 
The OECD Guidance documents highlight a five-step framework, which includes: 1, establishing strong 
company management systems; 2, identifying and assessing risks in the supply chain; 3, designing and 
implementing a strategy to respond to identified risks; 4, carrying out independent third party audit 
of supply chain due diligence; and 5, reporting annually on supply chain due diligence. Companies 
must assess actual and potential human rights impacts, integrate and act upon the findings, track 
responses and communicate how impacts are addressed.75 The OECD Guidance on Due Diligence for 
Responsible Business Conduct has developed these five steps into a six-step framework, 
recommending 1) embedding responsible business conduct into policies and management systems; 
2) identifying and assessing adverse impacts in operations, supply chains and business relationships; 
3) ceasing, preventing or mitigating adverse impacts; 4; tracking implementation and results; 5) 
communicating how impacts are addressed; and 6) providing for or cooperating in mediation when 
appropriate.76 
 
The OECD, together with input from the ILO, the IMF and the World Bank Group, has also published a 
guidance note to promote the sustainable development goals and to advise on due diligence 
requirements.77 These, as well as the 2018 Guidance on Responsible Business Conduct, include 
guidance on development and publication of a responsible business conduct policy to be integrated 
and embedded into a company’s management systems and activities and in its contracts with 
suppliers. Companies should regularly identify and assess any impacts adversely affecting their 
responsible business conduct and they should prevent or mitigate such impacts and track their 
performance. They should communicate with and account to stakeholders and they should seek to 
remedy any adverse impacts.78 The Ethical Trading Initiative has added its own guidance suggesting 
that the key features of due diligence include corporate leadership; establishing and revising 
appropriate policies, practices, strategies and decision-making systems that mitigate against the risks 
of labour rights abuses; increased transparency and visibility of supply chains; acceptance and 
recognition of the universal right of all workers to freedom of association and collective bargaining; 
commitment to ensuring remedy for negative impacts on workers; recognition of the importance of 
policy engagement with governments and other key stakeholders for greater state protection of 
workers’ rights; stakeholder engagement and partnerships; continuous improvement based on robust 
evidence, monitoring, and evaluation; and open and honest communication within the company, and 
with suppliers, stakeholders and workers and to the public.79  
 
                                                 
74 BHRRC, at 4.  
75 OECD Guidance on MNEs, Chapter IV, para 45.  
76 OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct 2018, 21-35. 
77 OECD, ILO, IMF, World Bank Group, Promoting Sustainable Global Supply Chains: International Standards, 
Due Diligence And Grievance Mechanisms, (February 2017), available at 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---europe/---ro-geneva/---ilo-
berlin/documents/genericdocument/wcms_556985.pdf   
78 Ibid, at 19. 
79 Ethical Trading Initiative, Human Rights Due Diligence Framework, May 2016, available at 
https://www.ethicaltrade.org/resources/human-rights-due-diligence-framework   
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Overall, we can see that due diligence goes much further than disclosure. It includes action to protect 
against and mitigate adverse impacts of a corporation’s or supply chain’s activities. These 
international initiatives have inspired regional and national due diligence measures. 
 
4.1.2 EU 
 
At EU level, as well as the EU’s Non-Financial Reporting Directive, an EU Regulation 2017/82180 was 
introduced, applicable since January 2017, which establishes obligations related to management 
systems, risk management, and independent third party audits for importers of conflict minerals. Such 
importers must prepare annual reports on the steps taken to implement those obligations as well as 
their supply chain due diligence policies and practices for responsible sourcing, and they must make 
available to their governments third party audit reports or evidence of conformity with a supply chain 
due diligence scheme.  
 
The European Parliament has introduced a ‘flagship initiative’ calling for similar due diligence 
requirements in the garment sector.81 In addition, an EU green card initiative proposes that EU-based 
companies operate under a duty of care towards individuals and local communities whose human 
rights or local environment are affected by corporate activities and Motion 2015/2589 requests the 
European Council to consider new EU legislation to create a legal obligation of due diligence for EU 
companies outsourcing to third countries, including measures to secure traceability and transparency. 
The European Parliament also passed a resolution in September 2017 based on a further motion – 
2016/2301 (INI) – for a resolution on the impact of international trade and the EU’s trade policies on 
global value chains which, among other things, calls on the Commission to work on the development 
of due diligence requirements.  
 
4.1.2 France82  
 
France recently introduced Law 2017-399 on the corporate duty of care for parent and subcontracting 
companies. In addition to their reporting obligations, companies must actually implement a due 
diligence plan and undertake ‘reasonable vigilance’ to make sure the plan is implemented. This ‘plan 
de vigilance’ will describe the company’s oversight mechanisms for identifying and mitigating any 
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, severe bodily or environmental damage or 
health risks resulting from the company’s activities or the activities of companies it controls or any of 
its subcontractors or suppliers. Companies must disclose their due diligence plan annually.83 The 
French law does not require that slavery or trafficking are eradicated, but that companies engage in 
oversight.84 The French law specifies the contents of the due diligence plan, including: risk mapping to 
identify, analyse and prioritise risks; processes for regular evaluation of subsidiaries, subcontractors 
and suppliers; appropriate actions to mitigate and prevent human rights and environmental 
violations; alert and whistleblowing mechanisms related to existing and potential risks; and 
mechanisms for monitoring and assessing the effectiveness of the measures implemented. 
                                                 
80 Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 laying down supply 
chain due diligence obligations for Union importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold 
originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas – see further chapter in this book by Iris Chiu. 
81 Resolution of 27 April 2017 on the EU flagship initiative on the garment sector, 2016/2140(INI), leading to 
the publication by the European Commission of a Commission Staff Working Document: Sustainable garment 
value chains through EU development action SWD (2017) 147. 
82 See further, Veronique Magnier,’ Corporate Law, Corporate Governance and Sustainability in France: An 
innovative old-fashioned model of governance’, chapter 20 in this volume. 
83 BHRRC, at 17. 
84 J. Martin, ‘Hiding in the Light: The Misuse of Disclosure to Advance the Business and Human Rights Agenda’, 
available at www.ssrn.com at 25. 
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4.1.3 The Netherlands  
The Netherlands is currently in the process of legislating for a duty of care to prevent child labour – 
the “Wet zorgplicht kinderarbeid’. Under this legislation, companies selling or delivering products or 
services to Dutch end users will be required to investigate and identify whether there is a reasonable 
suspicion that child labour is contributing to their delivering or selling of goods or services in their 
chain. If such a suspicion arises, a company must develop a plan of action to address it and issue a due 
diligence statement. A supervising authority will be appointed to monitor compliance with the Bill. 
The statement will be recorded in a public register, which will also be held by the supervising authority, 
thought likely to be the Dutch Authority on Consumers and Markets.85 Any stakeholder who has clear 
evidence that a company has used child labour to produce goods or services may submit a complaint 
to that company. If the company does not resolve the complaint satisfactorily with the stakeholder 
within six months, the stakeholder will then be able to submit the complaint to Dutch authorities, who 
may issue a legally-binding instruction ordering the company to conduct the required due diligence 
and make the appropriate declaration. A failure by the company to comply with the instruction will 
result in a fine of up to EUR 820,000 or, alternatively, 10% of their annual turnover and two or more 
failures within five years may lead to criminal penalties and more substantial fines. The companies 
covered by the legislation include not only companies that are registered with the Dutch trade register 
but also foreign companies if they deliver goods or services to end-users in the Netherlands more than 
once a year.86 At the time of writing, the law awaits approval by the Dutch Senate. 
4.1.4 Switzerland 
 
Switzerland is also working towards a potential article 101(a) on the Responsibility of Business in the 
Federal Constitution with the goal of obliging Swiss companies to incorporate respect for human rights 
and the environment in all their activities. The First Chamber of the Parliament approved the proposal 
in June 2018 and a counterproposal is awaiting consideration in the parliament’s Second Chamber.87 
If enacted, this new Constitutional provision will have extraterritorial effect by applying also to Swiss-
based companies’ activities abroad. Under the proposal, companies will be required to carry out 
appropriate due diligence. Companies will also be liable for damage caused by companies under their 
control where they have, in the course of business, committed violations of internationally recognized 
human rights or international environmental standards. They will not be liable, however, if they can 
prove that they took all due care to avoid the loss or damage, or that the damage would have occurred 
even if all due care had been taken.88 This Responsible Business Initiative is a popular initiative brought 
by a coalition led by NGOs, including Greenpeace and Amnesty International, and is supported by 85 
organisations working in international aid, women and human rights and environmental protection, 
as well as churches, unions and shareholders’ associations. In Switzerland, most popular initiatives do 
not achieve the required formal approval to become law, but even if unsuccessful, a popular initiative 
may still shape the political landscape by generating public debate, highlighting specific issues and 
putting pressure on politicians.89 The Swiss proposed law, if adopted, would require companies to 
                                                 
85 Stibbe, Bill adopted by Dutch Parliament introducing a duty of care to prevent child labour, 22 May 2017, at 
https://www.stibbe.com/en/news/2017/may/bill-adopted-by-dutch-parliament-introducing-a-duty-of-care-to-
prevent-child-labour  
86 Ibid. 
87 See European Coalition for Corporate Justice, Evidence for Mandatory HRDD legislation, Background Note, 
September 2018, at http://corporatejustice.org/policy-evidence-mhrdd-september-2018-final.pdf  
88 Swiss Coalition for Corporate Justice,  English Translation of the Initiative Text, available at http://konzern-
initiative.ch/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/The-initiative-text-with-explanations.pdf  
89 J. Hughes-Jennett,  P. Hood, and M. Davoise, Switzerland: The next frontier for mandatory human rights due 
diligence? Hogan Lovell, (1 December 2017), available at 
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identify real and potential impacts on internationally recognized human rights and the environment; 
take appropriate measures to prevent the violation of internationally recognized human rights and 
international environmental standards, cease existing violations, and account for the actions taken. 
On the 14th June, the Swiss National Council approved a counter-proposal which establishes human 
rights obligations for Swiss companies with respect to their overseas impacts, as well as civil liability 
for parent companies for the harm caused by entities under their control. As a compromise, the 
counter-proposal is not as far reaching as the Responsible Business Initiative in that it applies to large 
companies and the civil liability provisions are more restrictive. If this counter-proposal is accepted by 
the Council of State and adopted the Responsible Business Initiative will be withdrawn.90 
 
 
4.2 Evaluation of due diligence 
 
Due diligence demands an active evaluation and assessment so that, if it is clear that a company’s 
processes are having or are likely to have negative impacts, then such companies must show what 
steps they have taken to remove or mitigate those negative impacts. The international soft law and 
developing national legislative requirements in their detail indicate at least a potential for companies 
to be much more rigorous and proactive about what they are looking for in a due diligence process 
compared with mere disclosure, which does not necessarily require a company actively to investigate 
their processes deeply for assessing their impacts. If impacts come to light then disclosure provisions 
would require companies to reveal those impacts in their statements as well as to reveal publicly what 
their policies are to deal with potential impacts.  
 
Many of these provisions are not yet in a state of maturity. The EU provisions, for example, are limited 
to audits to demonstrate if due diligence processes have been developed or are Parliamentary 
Resolutions or Motions that have not yet resulted in concrete measures. The French law is still too 
recent for us to draw conclusions on its effectiveness and indicates no guarantee of prevention of 
human rights violations but rather that companies make efforts to eradicate or reduce those risks and 
be able to demonstrate those efforts. The Netherlands and Swiss efforts are still being developed and 
debated. Their provisions indicate at least a potential for greater effectiveness than the less radical 
disclosure requirements.  
 
The guidance documents published by the OECD and the ETI confirm that due diligence is not a process 
to be carried out in isolation from those who have a stake in their outcomes but requires 
communication with and involvement of stakeholders. The 2018 OECD guidance document provides 
detailed recommendations designed to help enterprises to implement a due diligence process and 
supporting measures to avoid and address adverse impacts that may be associated with their 
operations, supply chains and other business relationships. The document highlights the key features 
of due diligence: its purpose is to prevent adverse impacts, or where such adverse impacts cannot be 
avoided, to enable enterprises to mitigate them, prevent their recurrence and, where relevant, 
remediate them; that due diligence involves a bundle of interrelated processes to identify adverse 
impacts, prevent and mitigate them, track implementation and results and communicate on how 
adverse impacts are addressed; it is risk-based and can be prioritised in accordance with the risk 
severity and likelihood; that due diligence is a  dynamic process with feedback loops; it does not shift 
liabilities; it is adaptable to an enterprise’s circumstances and limitations; it is concerned with 
                                                 
https://www.hlregulation.com/2017/12/01/switzerland-the-next-frontier-for-mandatory-human-rights-due-
diligence/   
90 Swiss Coalition for Corporate Justice, Another step towards the adoption of a mandatory HRDD bill in 
Switzerland, 16 June 2018, at http://corporatejustice.org/news/7046-another-step-towards-the-adoption-of-
a-mandatory-hrdd-bill-in-switzerland  
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internationally recognised standards of responsible business conduct; it is informed by stakeholder 
engagement and involves ongoing communication.91     
 
Stakeholder engagement is arguably the key to effective due diligence. Indeed, it should play a pivotal 
role not least because, as the OECD Guidance stresses, due diligence is not about the business 
enterprise or the risks to the business but is about the people who are affected by its activities. Those 
people are relevant to the due diligence process and may make valuable contributions to the quality 
and effectiveness of the due diligence. Therefore, meaningful stakeholder engagement is a key 
component of due diligence.92 Indeed, commentators point out that effective approaches to human 
rights issues in global supply chains are characterised by companies engaging with a broad range of 
stakeholders. This requires them to take ‘a contextual and holistic approach by considering local 
circumstances and broader human rights, and by focusing on prevention and remediation.’93 Thus, by 
reducing information asymmetries, disclosure may enable weaker parties to participate more 
effectively and hold the corporate actors to account more easily.94 The shift towards stakeholder 
collaboration and due diligence may lead companies to adopt proactive and pluralistic strategies.95  
 
The challenge in the supply chain context, given the complexities of the supply chains, will be how to 
ensure that the stakeholders may participate effectively in the due diligence process. The OECD 
Guidelines of 2018 provide details about the what might be required for effective stakeholder 
engagement, telling us that stakeholder engagement involves interactive processes of engagement 
through, for example, meetings, hearings or consultation proceedings and that ‘meaningful 
stakeholder engagement is characterised by two-way communication and depends on the good faith 
of the participants’ as well as being responsive and on-going.96 Multi-stakeholder partnerships, and 
collaborations between corporations and civil society organisations such as NGOs, religious 
organisations and trade unions remain important97 as does the external threat of reputational damage 
strategies by those organisations. As Boersma suggests, ‘in adopting collaborative and pluralistic 
strategies and building on existing stakeholder expertise, companies can play a transformative role in 
the sectors and regions in which they operate.’98 Boersma emphasises in this respect a ‘shift from 
reactive and paternalistic tendencies of companies towards proactive and pluralistic strategies’99 that 
include, rather than exclude shareholders. If stakeholders come to be regarded as welcome members 
of the supply chain rather than as excluded adversaries the result might be safer, more sustainable 
and human rights respecting business enterprises.  
  
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
This chapter has identified a shift towards both disclosure and due diligence requirements in the 
regulation of corporations and their global supply chains. Existing soft law provisions may not have 
had any material impact on corporate activity but they provide a useful basis upon which some 
                                                 
91 OECD, Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct (2018) at 16-19.  
92 Ibid, at 50. See also OECD, Blog: the new OECD Due Diligence Guidance on Responsible Business Conduct 
OECD Watch 20 June 2018, at https://www.oecdwatch.org/news-en/blog-the-new-oecd-due-diligence-
guidance-on-responsible-business-conduct   
93 M. Boersma, ‘Changing approaches to child labour in global supply chains: Exploring the influence of multi-
stakeholder partnerships and the united nations guiding principles on business and human 
rights’, UNSWLJ, (2017) 40, 1249, at 1273. 
94 Mol, (2015)., at 154. 
95 Ibid. 
96 OECD, Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct, 2018, at 49-50. 
97 Ibid, at 50-51. 
98 Boersma, at 1271. 
99 Boersma, at 1272. 
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national hard law provisions have been and continue to be developed. Disclosure has been shown to 
be limited in its capacity to identify fully the impacts of corporate and supply chain activities and has 
not led to reduction of adverse impacts or true accountability or remedies for harms caused. The 
national due diligence provisions that have been inspired by international principles and guidance 
promise greater effect as they require companies to make efforts to eradicate or mitigate their 
negative impacts. The possibility of enforcement sanctions, as is anticipated with the developing child 
labour law in the Netherlands, may be an important shift. This may also require further refinement to 
impose liability upon the actor within the supply chain with the most control. A key feature of the 
emerging due diligence will be the collaboration with stakeholders and campaigners acting on their 
behalf.  If successful, these due diligence developments will be a significant contribution to the goals 
of sustainable development. Whilst focusing especially on human rights related issues, they will feed 
into the broader strong sustainability agenda by working towards the mitigation of or eradication of 
inequality and exploitation and human suffering.      
 
 
